We introduce a new axiom for power indices, which requires the total (additively aggregated) power of the voters to be nondecreasing in response to an expansion of the set of winning coalitions; the total power is thereby re ‡ecting an increase in the collective power that such an expansion creates. It is shown that total-power monotonic indices that satisfy the standard semivalue axioms are probabilistic mixtures of generalized Coleman-Shapley indices, where the latter concept extends, and is inspired by, the notion introduced in Casajus and Huettner (2018). Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices are based on a version of the random-order pivotality that is behind the Shapley-Shubik index, combined with an assumption of random participation by players. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C71, D72.
Introduction
The Shapley-Shubik power index 1 the e¢ ciency axiom -whereby the total power of the voter set is 1, independently of 1 De…ned in Shapley and Shubik (1954) . 2 As if often done in the literature, we use the term "Banzhaf index" for brevity, although the origin of this power index lies in multiple works (Penrose (1946) , Banzhaf (1965 Banzhaf ( , 1966 Banzhaf ( , 1968 , Coleman (1971) ). The speci…c variant of the Banzhaf index used in this work is referred to as the "Banzhaf measure" in Felsenthal and Machover (1998) . 3 All quotations in this sentence are taken from Dubey and Shapley (1979, p. 103 ).
the particular decision rule. Dubey and Shapley (1979) , who axiomatized the Banzhaf power index, assumed the total power of all voters to be equal to the expected number of swing voters, or "swingers," 4 in the voter set; this number is also known as the "sensitivity of the decision rule" (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) , Section 3.3).
Following the discovery of the 2-e¢ ciency of the Banzhaf index by Lehrer (1988) , whereby the combined power of any two voters remains unchanged if the two voters "merge" and act as a single bloc, multiple axiomatizations of the Banzhaf index were o¤ered based on relaxed versions of that property. 5 Recently, Casajus and Huettner (2018) suggested a new power index, which they named the Coleman-Shapley index, with an underlying probability model that very naturally combines the assumptions behind the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices. Speci…cally, the power of an individual voter is, again, his probability of being pivotal, but in the following hybrid situation. Similarly to the Banzhaf scenario, each individual votes "yes" with probability ; independently of the other voters;
an alternative, equivalent, assumption would be that an individual is only interested in/capable of voting with probability : As in the Shapley-Shubik scenario, the pivotality of a voter is de…ned with respect to a random order (re ‡ecting the "enthusiasm") of all active 6 voters; the probability of being pivotal is now conditional on the voter being active. Thus, the notion of pivotality here still implies the ability to a¤ect the content of a proposal, but the passage of the proposal is now viewed as uncertain. The characteristic feature of the Coleman-Shapley index is that the total power of all voters coincides with a well-recognized concept -the power attributed to individual voters sums up to (twice) the Coleman's (1971) "power of a collectivity to act," de…ned as the proportion of winning sets among all (sub)sets of voters. favors games where the outcome of the vote appears, a priori, to be very uncertain, as this is when individual voters have a good chance to be pivotal. Indeed, as shown in Dubey and Shapley (1979) , the total Banzhaf power of a given voter set is maximal for the simple majority rule, as that rule creates the greatest instability in the outcome of the vote, under the assumption that votes are cast completely at random and independently across individuals.
The total power behaves in a notably di¤erent fashion, however, under the other two indices. The total Shapley-Shubik power is …xed at 1, and hence the simple majority rule has the same standing as the rest. Under the Coleman-Shapley index, the total power, which is identi…able with the aforementioned Coleman power of collectivity to act, is at the intermediate level for the simple majority rule, falling with an increase in the majority quota. Indeed, Coleman's measure of the power of collectivity is concerned with the ease of a collective achievement. Thus, higher quotas mean a lower number of winning sets, and, accordingly, lower collective power.
The above monotonicity feature of the total Coleman-Shapley power extends from the simple majority to general, not necessarily symmetric and quota-based, decision rules: the smaller is the set of winning sets (as in the particular case of a rising majority quota), the lower is the total power of the voters. This property appears to be quite reasonable if one wishes the total power, obtained by additive aggregation of the individual power, to measure, or at least be highly correlated with, some form of collective power held by the voters (naturally, collective power should respond positively to an expansion of the set of winning coalitions).
Our concern in this work will be with power indices whose implied total power re ‡ects collective power in the sense indicated above. We will call the property whereby the total power in nondecreasing when winning sets are added total-power monotonicity, or TP-monotonicity. Following the approach pioneered in Shapley and Shubik (1954) and adopted in much of the literature on power indices, we will model voting situations/decision rules as cooperative games known as simple (or voting) games, and view a power index as a map de…ned on the domain of simple games.
The focus will be on power indices that are semivalues, a term that was borrowed by Einy (1987) from the realm of value maps considered by Dubey et al. (1981) , and applied to power indices that satisfy four axioms that are quite standard and …gure prominently in the literature on axiomatizations. These axioms are: transfer (or valuation), which has been a routine substitute for the additivity axiom for value maps in the context of simple games since its introduction in Dubey (1975) ; positivity, or non-negativity of the power index; symmetry, which requires covariance under permutations of the player (voter) set; and dummy, whereby the power of a dummy player (which can only be a null player, or a dictator, in a simple game) equals to the payo¤ of his stand-alone coalition.
Our …rst contribution will be the identi…cation of a one-parametric class of TPmonotonic semivalues. These semivalues constitute a natural generalization of the Coleman-Banzhaf index of Casajus and Huettner (2018) . For any q 2 (0; 1]; we will de…ne the q-Coleman-Banzhaf index (or q-CS index, for short) in the same way as the Coleman-Banzhaf index above, but with the following change: each voter's probability to be active (i.e., to vote "yes," or to be interested in/capable of voting, depending on the interpretation) is now taken to be q, and not : As before, di¤erent individuals are independent in their activity status, and the q-CS index assigns each voter his probability (conditional on being an active voter) of being a pivot in a uniformly distributed random order of all active voters. The total q-CS power is a ( 8 In the context of a simple game, a pivot for a coalition is a player whose presence switches that coalition from losing to winning. 9 Theorem 1 contains the di¢ cult "only if" direction of this statement. The simpler "if" direction is proved in Remark 1.
Preliminaries 2.1 Finite games and simple (voting) games
Let U be an in…nite universe of players (or voters), and assume, w.l.o.g., that U includes the set N of positive integers. Denote the collection of all coalitions (subsets of U ) by 2 U ; and the empty coalition by ;: A game on U is given by a map v :
We say that v is a …nite game if it has a …nite carrier; the minimal carrier of such v is, in e¤ect, its true player set. The space of all …nite games on U is denoted 
Power indices and Semivalues
A power index ' is a map ' : SG ! AG, where ' (v) (i) is interpreted as the voting power of player i in a simple game v. The following four axioms -plausible requirements that a general power index ' may be expected to obey -are quite routinely assumed in analyzing and designing power indices, either in their entirety or in part.
As in Einy (1987) , who was the …rst to look at the conjunction of these four axioms, we will use the term semivalue 11 in reference to any power index ' that satis…es all the axioms. 12 10 We shall henceforth omit braces when indicating one-player sets. 11 The term "semivalue" was originally coined in Dubey et al (1981) in the context of value maps on G (see Remark 2) . 12 Variants of semivalue axioms have been present in the original axiomatizations of the ShapleyShubik and the Banzhaf power indices (see Dubey (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979) ).
Axiom I: Transfer. For any v; w 2 SG, ' (maxfv; wg) + ' (minfv; wg) =
As was shown in Dubey et al. (2005, p. 24) , Tran can be restated in an equivalent but conceptually clearer form, amounting to a requirement that the change in power depends only on the change in the voting game. 13 Axiom II: Symmetry. For any v 2 SG, i 2 U; and a permutation of U;
According to Symmetry, if players are relabeled in a game, their power indices will be relabeled accordingly. Thus, irrelevant characteristics of the players, outside of their role in the game v, have no in ‡uence on the power index.
Axiom III: Positivity. For any v 2 SG and
Positivity is natural, as every v 2 SG is monotonic by assumption, and hence no player that joins a coalition can a¤ect its winning status negatively.
A dummy player in a simple game can be either a dictator ( for every v 2 SG with some …nite carrier N;
Characterization of Semivalues
if i 2 N; where
and (v) (i) = 0 if i 2 U n N: The de…nition is independent of the choice of a carrier N:
Einy (1987) showed that the set of semivalues on SG coincides with the family
: Formally, a power index ' is a semivalue if and only if ' = for some 2 M ([0; 1]) ; and is uniquely determined by ': Relying on this equivalence, the term semivalue will henceforth be used in reference to some member of the family
.
Each semivalue has a simple probabilistic interpretation. Assume that player i believes that players other than himself have the same probability x of voting "yes"
(thereby joining the coalition of yes-voters), and that they do so independently of each other; however, i may be uncertain about the parameter x; with his prior belief being the distribution over x: Then (v) (i) represents i's a priori likelihood to switch a random coalition of yes-voters from losing to winning by joining it.
If the parameter x is known, one may refer to the corresponding semivalue, for which is the Dirac measure concentrated on x; as x-value, which will be denoted x for simplicity. A general is then a probabilistic mixture of x-values: the de…nition of implies that, for every v 2 SG and i 2 U;
The family
includes the two best-known and widely used semival- : Its probabilistic interpretation will be discussed in the next section, in a unifying set-up that will single out a subfamily of semivalues in
Generalized Coleman-Shapley Indices and TotalPower Monotonicity
The de…nition of the Coleman-Shapley index in Casajus and Huettner (2018) allows to conjure up a more general framework, in which the Shapley-Shubik and the ColemanShapley indices are included as particular cases. We will de…ne generalized ColemanShapley indices as a one-pramateric family of semivalues, and will then show how these indices arise in two models of random voting.
Generalized Coleman-Shapley Indices as Semivalues
For any 0 q 1; consider the probability measure q 2 M ([0; 1]) that is concentrated on the interval [0; q] and, when q > 0; corresponds to the uniform distribution
where I A denotes the indicator function of the set A. Denote ' q = q ; and call it q-Coleman-Shapley index, or q-CS index for short.
Random-arrival interpretation of q-CS Indices
When q > 0; the de…nition of the q-CS index by means of (1), (2) and (4) lends itself to the following probabilistic interpretation, which is a version of the "random arrival times" view that has usually been reserved for the Shapley value and the weighted Shapley value (starting with Owen (1968)). Let v 2 SG be a game with some …nite carrier N; and let fX i g i2N be i.i.d. random variables with the uniform distribution on [0; 1]: Think of X i as measuring the dissatisfaction of player i with a certain proposal that stands for vote; the given parameter q represents the cut-o¤ value of dissatisfaction above which a player will never vote in favor of a proposal.
Players whose dissatisfaction falls below or is equal to q will, on the other hand, ultimately vote "yes", but their turn to join the support of the proposal depends on their measure of dissatisfaction: the higher is X i ; the later will i join the other yes-voters. It stands to reason that, in such a scenario, the in ‡uence of player i over the vote should be quanti…ed as the probability (conditional on i being a yes-voter, having X i q) that the coalition of the proposal supporters switches from losing to winning precisely when i's turn arrives and he declares his support for the proposal.
The measure of voting power given by ' q (v) (i) = q (v) (i) does exactly that.
Formally, (1), (2) and (4) mean that
for every i 2 N (and ' q (v) (i) = 0 for every i 2 U n N ), which can be readily seen to be a restatement in terms of integrals of the equality
where E stands for the expectation operator. The last equality is itself equivalent to
Random-order interpretation of q-CS Indices
The following alternative description of a q-CS index can be derived from (5). Given v 2 SG with a …nite carrier N; consider a random coalition S N N de…ned by the property that, for each i 2 N; Pr i 2 S N = q; and the events i 2 S N i2N are independent. We can think of S N as the coalition of players who are interested in, or capable of, voting for a speci…c proposal. 15 Call the players in S N active.
Additionally, let R N be a random linear order of players in N; chosen w.r.t. to the uniform distribution over all such orders, and assume that the choice of order is made independently of the realization of S N : R N can be thought of as the ranking of players w.r.t. their eagerness to vote in favor of the proposal; note that R N ranks all players, including those who might not be active. For any such R N and i 2 N; denote by S i (R N ) the (random) coalition of players in N that precede i in R N (according to our interpretation, S i (R N ) consists of players who like the proposal more than i). Then (5) is equivalent to
or
Just as in the random-arrival approach, here ' q (v) (i) is expressed as the probability that i is switches from losing to winning the coalition of active voters who are ranked below i (i.e., are stronger than i) in their support, conditional on that i is active. In order to see how (7) is obtained from (5) of the random-arrival set-up, take R N be the order induced by the relative positions of the players in fX i g i2N ; and let S N = fi 2 N j X i qg; notice that even though such R N is not independent of
when there is a conditioning on i 2 S N :
16
Note that 1-CS index, ' 1 , is the Shapley-Shubik power index, as (6) or (8) boil down to its usual de…nition as the (unconditional) probability of being pivotal in a random order. Also, when q = is precisely that index:
The Total Power in q-CS Indices
The total power of players under a given q-CS index can be computed directly, but we will …nd it as an upshot of a more general exercise. It turns out, as has been already observed by Casajus and Huettner (2018) in the case of ' 1
2
, that for any 0 < q 1 the q-CS index of v 2 SG can be expressed as the Shapley (1953) value of an appropriately modi…ed game. Indeed, let v q 2 G be the game in which the payo¤ to any coalition S is the 1 q -scaled probability that the coalition of active players in S is winning in the game v; i.e., v q (S) = 1 q E v(S \ S N ) : Also recall that, for any game w 2 G with a …nite carrier N; its Shapley value Sh(w) is de…ned as
] for every i 2 N (and Sh (w) (i) = 0 for every i 2 U n N ): 16 In (7), R N can be replaced by R S N (a random, uniformly distributed order of players in S N ),
i.e., it su¢ ces to rank only the active players. Such an equation would have been the reduced form of both (5) and (7), consistent with our description of the q-CS index in the Introduction. The current (7) is preferable, however, as it is used in the proof of our forthcoming Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For any q; v as above and i
Proof. For any i 2 N; by using the independence of S i (R N ) and S N ; (7) can be transformed into
Finally, when i 2 U n N , ' q (v) (i) = 0 and Sh(v q )(i) = 0 by de…nition.
Proposition 1 and the e¢ ciency of the Shapley value imply that, for 0 < q 1 and v 2 SG with a …nite carrier N;
which is equivalent to
That is, the total power in the game v, as measured by ' q , is a constant multiple ( Similar axiomatizations can be obtained for any ' q ; with (10) as a substitute for 2CPCA-e¢ ciency, where the right-hand side is viewed as an alternative measure of the power of a collectivity to act.
which can be seen as a limit version of (10), obtained by letting q > 0 tend to 0:
The Axiom of Total-Power Monotonicity
When the set of winning coalitions in the game expands, there is no guarantee that the individual power of every (or even most) players will not be a¤ected negatively. to ' 1 (u T 0 ) = 0; which is to be expected as the players in T nT 0 become null in u T 0 , despite there being more winning coalitions. However, the total power of players, ' 1 (v) (U ) = 1; remains constant regardless of changes in v:
When a general q-CS index ' q is concerned, the total power ' q (v) (U ) may depend on v; but if the set of winning coalitions in v expands, i.e., if v 2 SG is replaced by w 2 SG that satis…es v w; the total power cannot go down:
This fact is immediate from (9) when q > 0; and from (11) when q = 0:
The property embodied in (12) Claim. Let 0 < a < b < 1 and 0 < c < d 1 be such that c a = d b > 0:
Proof of the claim. We shall …rst establish (13) under the assumption that
Fix > 0; and let 0 < " < b a 2 be such that ([t ; t + ]) < for t 2 fa; b; c; dg; where t + = min(t + "; 1); t = max(t "; 0): Also, for any n 2 N such that
and any
x be a random variable with the binomial distribution B(n; x): Then
(where [t] stands for the integer part of t)
By the Chebishev's inequality,
and hence the expression in (15) is bound from below by
For k = 0; :::; n; let w n+1;k+1 2 SG be the k + 1-majority game with carrier N = f1; :::; n + 1g; i.e., w n+1;k+1 (S) = 1 if and only if jS \ N j k + 1: It follows from the de…nition of in (1) and (2) that (w n+1;k+1 ) (U ) = (n + 1)
and so the right-hand side of (17) is equal to
(w n+1;k+1 ) (U ) 1 n" 2 2 :
We have thereby established that
Since: (i) satis…es TP-Mon; (ii) w n+1;k+1 w n+1;k 0 +1 whenever k k 0 ; and
(w n+1;k+1 ) (U )
(w n+1;k+1 ) (U ) :
From this, (18) and (19),
we obtain
By using the Chebishev's inequality (16) was arbitrary, the desired inequality (13) is established under the assumption (14) .
We will now show that assumption (14) can be dispensed with. First, notice that when d = 1; all the arguments above work without the need to pass from d to d :
Hence, it is not necessary to assume that (fdg) = 0 when d = 1 (and, in addition, (fa; b; cg) = 0), in order to obtain (13).
Next, for any 0 < x < y 1; there exists a sequence f(a n ; b n ; c n ; d n )g 1 n=1 such that 0 < a n < x < b n < 1; 0 < c n < y d n 1; c n a n = d n b n > 0;
lim n!1 a n = lim n!1 b n = x; lim n!1 c n = lim n!1 d n = y; (fa n ; b n ; c n g) = 0; and (fd n g) = 0 (unless d n = 1): As (13) holds for such a n ; b n ; c n ; d n by what has been shown, we have ((a n ; b n ]) ((c n ; d n ]) ; which translates into (fxg) (fyg) by letting n ! 1: Since the latter inequality holds for all 0 < x < y 1; cannot have atoms in (0; 1]: It follows that (14) always holds, and hence (13) Now, given 0 x < y 1, consider any rational number 0 < r < 1, which has the form r = m n for some n > m 2 N: Successive applications of (20) yield
and hence
holds for r = 
Proof. The fact that any q-CS index ' q satis…es TP-Mon has already been noted (see (12) ), and it is obvious that any mixture ' of generalized CS indices,
given by (22), inherits this property. This establishes the "if" direction. Next, let g 0 be any continuous function on [0; 1] ; and assume that F (0) < 1: 17 Continuity of F was established in the proof of Theorem 1, but we did not need to claim both continuity and concavity in the statement of that theorem because concavity of F on [0; 1] implies its continuity on that interval. Indeed, the only discontinuity of a concave function on [0; 1] might occur at the end-points, but that is impossible because F is right-continuous and nondecreasing as a c.d.f. 18 One may take f to be the left-hand derivative of F on (0; 1]: If lim x!0+ f (x) = 1; then all integrals in the proof that have the form R t 0 :::dx (for 0 < t 1), and in which the integrand involves f (x); should be regarded as improper integrals. 19 The limit a exists because f is nondecreasing, and its positivity follows from the assumption that F (0) < 1: It may, furthermore, be equal to 1: 
